Germany's far-right party victory: A return of Hitler?

The convergence of far-right and left in Germany: Is economic despair bridging ideological divides?

Saxony-Anhalt has been shaken by the historic victory of the Alternative for Germany party or AfD . The right-wing party is now just three seats away from power with 43.8 percent of the vote and 39 seats in the 83-member assembly. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which has been in power for two decades, has dropped to about 17.2 percent. Voter turnout also reached a record high of 76.5 percent. This cannot be attributed to a mere coincidence due to low voter turnout.

The most peculiar aspect of this election is that the right-wing AfD could find a path to power through the left wing coalition Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) could open the way for AfD. BSW has received five seats. If its legislators support AfD, the number could cross the majority threshold. The CDU, Social Democratic Party, and other mainstream parties are currently refusing any agreement with AfD. In Germany, this is referred to as 'Brandmauer', or a political firewall standing around the far-right. However, when voters give a party close to half the votes, this wall becomes a test of both moral resolve and arithmetic.

Is BSW an extreme leftist party?

Calling BSW directly 'extreme left' does not present the full picture. Its founder Sahra Wagenknecht was a prominent leader of the party Die Linke, which emerged from the communist tradition of East Germany. In economic matters, BSW advocates leftist ideas such as a strong welfare state, high wages, pension security, and curbing large corporate interests. However, its stance on immigration, cultural identity, and social liberalism often appears conservative. This is why political scientists refer to it as 'left-conservative' or 'populist.'

The ideological origins of AfD and BSW are different. AfD emphasizes German nationalism, strict immigration policies, skepticism towards the European Union, and a focus on traditional cultural identity. Nevertheless, both parties oppose sending weapons to Ukraine and advocate normalizing relations with Russia and calling for reconsideration of sanctions and reporting that the political establishments in Berlin and Brussels are disconnected from the common people. This shared ground makes potential cooperation possible. The old straight line of politics, with the left on one end and the right on the other, now resembles something like a horseshoe.

It is important to note that Saxony-Anhalt was once part of the German Democratic Republic, i.e., East Germany. After reunification in 1990, West Germany invested heavily, modernizing roads, railways, cities, and industries; however, economic disparities have not been completely eliminated. The state's population has decreased from about 2.9 million in 1990 to around 2.1–2.2 million today. The migration of young people, especially educated women, to the West has led to an aging population, vacant homes, and a shortage of workers in many small towns.

Journey of AfD : From anti-Euro to Nationalism

The AfD was born in 2013 out of opposition to the euro currency and the European debt crisis. Its early leadership was dominated by economists and conservative figures from universities. After the refugee crisis in 2015, the party's focus quickly shifted towards anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and cultural nationalism. Its organization became more radical and successful in the eastern states. What was initially seen as a temporary platform for discontented conservatives gradually built a permanent voter base, local activists, and an effective social media machine.

In the 2025 federal elections, the AfD emerged as the second-largest force in Germany, garnering nearly 21 percent of the votes, but its performance was significantly stronger in the eastern states. In Saxony-Anhalt, it received about 37.1 percent of the party list votes. The 43.8 percent in the provincial elections of September 2026 is not a sudden explosion but the next phase of a trend that has been growing over several elections. Notably, the AfD has promoted itself as a ‘suppressed voice despite receiving the most votes’ due to being kept away from power by opposing parties. This victimhood narrative has become its political capital.

The wealth gap is even deeper. According to the 2017 survey by the German Central Bank, the average wealth of families in western Germany was approximately €92,500, while in eastern Germany, it was only €23,400. This means about a quarter. The reason is not just current wages. Many families in the west inherited homes, land, businesses, and financial assets across generations; the communist East Germany had limited scope for private capital accumulation. Even after reunification, this inheritance gap persisted. Therefore, despite being one country and having the same citizenship, the starting line was not the same.

It would be incorrect to say that eastern Germany is only a story of poverty. Unemployment has decreased significantly compared to the early years of reunification, and many industrial projects have reached there. Nevertheless, Saxony-Anhalt is still considered one of the lowest-income states in Germany. High energy prices, pressure on industries, inflation, concerns over pensions, and fears of shrinking public services are felt more acutely here than the national average. Even when economic indicators improve, the feeling of ‘being left behind’ may persist.

Not only the Capitalists are voting for AfD

It is also inaccurate to view the far-right as merely a politics of wealthy capitalists. In the voter studies of the 2025 German federal elections, the AfD received nearly 38 percent support among blue-collar workers, while its support was around 39 percent among those reporting a poor economic situation. In the 2024 Thuringia elections, 51 percent of voters reporting a poor economic situation and 49 percent of workers voted for the AfD. In Saxony, the figure among workers that year was 45 percent.

This shift poses serious questions for the European left. In the 20th century, factory workers, trade union members, and low-income families were considered the natural base of social democratic or communist parties. Now, amid factory closures, temporary employment, depopulation of towns, and cultural changes, those same voters have begun to see economic security and national borders as one and the same issue. If traditional left parties appear to speak only the language of metropolitan, educated, and culturally liberal classes, nationalist right parties borrow the language of the welfare state and worker dignity. BSW is attempting to fill this void from the left.

These figures do not conclude that every AfD voter is poor or has turned right-wing solely due to economic crisis. Immigration, fear of crime, national identity, the cost of climate policies, distrust during the COVID period, and dissatisfaction with mainstream media are also significant. However, it is certainly clear that the insecure working class now constitutes a large part of the traditional socialist or social democratic parties rather than nationalist parties seeking protection. The AfD may have some free market policies, but in electoral language, it presents itself as a shield for ‘real Germans’.

Weimar Republic as a warning

Germany's history provides a terrifying context for this parallel rise.

In the 1928 parliamentary elections, the Nazi Party received only 2.6 percent of the votes. After the Great Depression, in 1930, its share rose to 18.3 percent, while the Communist Party KPD garnered 13.1 percent. By July 1932, the Nazi Party reached 37.3 percent and KPD 14.3 percent. Together, they received more than half of the votes from parties that did not accept the Weimar's liberal democratic system in its then form. On the other hand, centrist coalitions broke down, governments became unstable, and reliance on presidential emergency orders increased instead of parliament.

However, to equate today's Germany with 1932 would be a historical mistake. The current constitution has a strong constitutional court, a federal structure, independent media, civil society, and a security system that emerged from the Nazi experience. The AfD and BSW are not the same parties; their voters and goals intersect in many ways. Nevertheless, the useful warning from Weimar is that democracy does not run solely on institutions. When a large number of citizens feel that the established parties do not understand their language then mutually opposed extreme options can become stronger together. They use each other as examples of fear, and the political center begins to hollow out.

This trend is not limited to Germany. In Norway, the right-wing Progress Party (FrP) and the left-wing Rødt have different social bases and policies, yet both have at times presented themselves as alternatives to the established power structure.

Will AfD be able to form a government?

Currently, the answer is not clear. The AfD has 39 seats and needs 42 for a majority. The five seats of BSW could be decisive, but support is not guaranteed. Direct coalitions, external support, absence in a vote, or alternative governments by opposition parties are all possible routes. If the ‘firewall’ of mainstream parties remains intact, the AfD could remain the largest party in opposition. If the firewall breaks, it will open the path for the first time since World War II for a far-right-led government in any German state.

This arithmetic hides another democratic dilemma. If the remaining parties form extremely unequal coalitions solely to stop the AfD, the government will be legal but may appear opportunistic to voters. If they allow the AfD to come to power, there will be a risk of institutional changes in areas such as administration, education, public broadcasting, police, and migration. A better answer is not just the technique of coalition but a clear governance agenda. Visible results in local hospitals, transport, energy, industry, and pensions. ‘We are not the AfD’ cannot remain a sufficient electoral message for long.

It would be easy to dismiss this outcome as mere voter stupidity, racism, or a return to the past, but that will not solve the problem. A clear resistance to racism and anti-democratic language is essential; it is also necessary to listen to the concrete circumstances that give rise to such votes. Issues like declining population, less inherited wealth, insecure employment, expensive energy, weak local services, and distance from decision-making processes. If the democratic center does not provide credible answers to these questions, extreme parties will seize their answers.

Saxony-Anhalt has the message that the far right and the left therefore do not come close to each other because their entire ideology has become one but rather because both draw political energy from broken trust. When voters begin to see the current system as a problem, ‘anti-establishment’ becomes more important than direction. Germany now faces the real challenge of not just stopping the AfD from coming to power but also bridging the social divide that has pushed almost every other voter towards it. The firewall of democracy is built in the parliament, but its foundation lies in employment, respect, equal opportunities, and the belief that the government listens to the citizen.